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Buchmiller: Request Denied

NOTE
Request Denied: Retaliation Under Title VII
for a Request for Religious Accommodation
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Memorial Health Care,
908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Jan. 22, 2019).
Rhett Buchmiller*

I. INTRODUCTION
“Ask and you shall receive” may be helpful for many aspects of one’s
faith, but it is not sound legal advice when dealing with religious
accommodations. The ability to request accommodations for a religious
purpose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)1 has
eliminated the need for followers of faith to choose between religion and work
when the two conflict. It does this by requiring an employer to accommodate
employees who have a religious conflict, so long as the accommodation does
not create an undue hardship.2 This is the proverbial sword employees can
use to insist that their rights are respected by their employers. The shield
comes in the form of the retaliation clause of Title VII, where employees can
assert claims of adverse employment actions that arise from the utilization of
rights under Title VII.3
These two tools – reasonable accommodations and protection from
retaliatory actions – and more specifically their concurrent use, came into
question when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Memorial Health
Care.4 That case addressed the question of whether a request for an
accommodation was truly an action that opposed an unlawful practice by an
employer.5 A job applicant at North Memorial Health Care (“North
Memorial”) requested a religious accommodation shortly after getting an offer

* B.A., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University
of Missouri School of Law, 2020; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2019–2020. I thank Professor Rigel Oliveri as well as the wonderful staff at the
Missouri Law Review for their expertise and diligence in editing this Note.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018).
2. § 2000e(j) (2018).
3. § 2000e-3(a).
4. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1099 (8th Cir. 2018).
5. Id. at 1102.
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of employment.6 Shortly afterward, North Memorial rescinded the job offer,
claiming it could not meet the applicant’s request.7 The Eighth Circuit
ultimately concluded that an assertion of the right to an accommodation was
not a protected activity under Title VII, even though the same type of activity
is protected under other, similarly worded, statutes.8 Therefore, the
applicant’s claim of retaliation, which only applies to protected activities,
could not withstand summary judgment.9
This Note considers the reasoning of the majority panel in finding
requests for religious accommodation are not protected activities.
Particularly, it examines analogous caselaw from the Eighth Circuit under
similarly worded provisions in other statutes, as well as from other Federal
Circuits throughout the United States. This Note concludes by describing the
possible repercussions of this ruling considering the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Emily Sure-Ondara (“Appellant”), through an action initiated by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”), filed for appeal
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, asking the court to
reconsider the lower court’s ruling on her claim for retaliation on the basis of
religious discrimination.10 Appellant is a Seventh Day Adventist who alleged
she was denied a position at North Memorial due to her request for religious
accommodation.11 As a Seventh Day Adventist, Appellant is required to take
a day of rest on the Sabbath, which is generally recognized as falling on the
seventh day of the week, Saturday.12 In addition, a Seventh Day Adventist
must prepare for the Sabbath the day before, meaning that the day of rest
actually begins at sundown on Friday.13 Respondent was North Memorial, a
hospital system who rescinded Appellant’s offer of employment.14
Appellant, a registered nurse, applied to a residency program at North
Memorial known as the “Advanced Beginner” program.15 After initial
screening, Appellant visited a hiring event where she interviewed for, and was
subsequently offered a job with, North Memorial’s Robbinsdale hospital.16
6. Id. at 1099.
7. Id. at 1100.
8. Id. at 1103–04.
9. Id. at 1103.
10. Id. at 1099.
11. Id.
12. Sabbath Observance, SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST WORLD CHURCH (1990),
https://www.adventist.org/en/information/official-statements/documents/article/go//sabbath-observance-1/ [perma.cc/BQC7-SACA].
13. Id.; N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1099.
14. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1099.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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During this interview, but before the offer, Appellant learned the unit she
would work in required her to work eight-hour shifts every other weekend.17
Appellant accepted a conditional job offer but later disclosed that she needed
an accommodation in the form of not working Friday nights due to her
religious beliefs.18
In follow-ups from a representative of North Memorial’s Human
Resources Department, North Memorial clarified with Appellant that working
on weekends was a requirement.19 This was because the work schedule was
arranged via a collectively bargained union agreement.20 Appellant assured
the representative that she would “make it work,” either by finding a substitute
for the shifts at issue or being present for her shift in cases of emergency.21
North Memorial was less convinced; considerations were given to the
difficulty of having other nurses consistently cover Appellant’s shifts as well
as the need for there to be an “emergency,” as she said.22 North Memorial
subsequently informed Appellant of its inability to grant the accommodation,
as it would be an undue hardship.23 Appellant again stated that she would
accept the position without accommodation but was told that North Memorial
did not believe she would be able and willing to do so if given the position.24
Appellant never began work at North Memorial.25 Her conditional offer
was rescinded on November 20, 2013, and follow-up applications for other
positions with North Memorial were unsuccessful.26 Appellant filed a charge
of discrimination claim with the EEOC on December 13, 2013, which then
filed suit against North Memorial on September 16, 2015 on her behalf.27 The
EEOC alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), claiming that North
Memorial had unlawfully retaliated against Appellant’s request for
accommodation by rescinding the offer of employment.28 The district court
focused on whether a request for accommodation was a “protected activity”
under § 2000e-3(a), finding that the plain meaning of the statute did not
incorporate a request for accommodation as a protected activity.29 As such,
the court granted summary judgment for North Memorial.30

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 262 F. Supp. 3d 863, 866 (D. Minn. 2017).
N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1100.
N. Mem’l Health Care, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 868–69.
Id.
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On appeal, a divided Eighth Circuit panel agreed with the judgment of
the district court and affirmed the ruling.31 The court held that in instances
where a request for religious accommodation is made by an applicant, the
request is denied on the grounds of undue hardship, and the applicant is
subsequently not hired despite evidence that the undue hardship would no
longer be present, there is no cause of action under the retaliation provision of
Title VII and summary judgment is appropriate.32

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is a federal law that prohibits
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin.33 Title VII does this in a variety of ways and creates multiple causes
of action for plaintiffs. Commonly, these actions fall under the category of
either (1) discriminatory conduct of the employer based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, or (2) retaliatory conduct for the employee’s
opposition to unlawful employment practices.34 Discriminatory conduct of
the employer can include claims for disparate impact35 and disparate
treatment.36 These claims are enforced by the EEOC.37 This Section will
address the general nature of protected activities under Title VII, as well as
similar provisions found in other substantially similar laws.

A. Burdens and Claims Under Title VII Generally
A fundamental case in the general context of employment law that sets
out the burdens of proof parties bear at trial is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.38 McDonnell Douglas involved a claim of racial discrimination and
retaliation for civil protests.39 In this context, the United States Supreme
Court determined that a certain order of the burdens of proof needed to be
established in Title VII claims to properly meet the goals of the statute –

31. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1104.
32. Id.
33. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm [perma.cc/FQQ9-49FK].
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2-3 (2018).
35. Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2010) (holding that a policy absent
discriminatory intent can still be unlawfully discriminatory if it disparately impacts a
protected group).
36. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (holding that disparate
treatment occurs when an employer has “treated a particular person less favorably than
others because of a protected trait.”).
37. § 2000-e4.
38. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
39. Id. at 796.
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known as the McDonnell Douglas Framework.40 Under the McDonnell
Douglas Framework, a plaintiff is required to make a prima facie case for its
respective claims first and then, in response, the defendant has the burden to
produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse decision.41
The analysis does not end there, however, since a mere burden to produce
evidence would allow employers to evade litigation for thinly veiled
discrimination.42 Therefore, the plaintiff must have an opportunity to show
that the stated reason of the employer was in fact pretextual.43 It is within this
analytical framework that the court in North Memorial considered the issue of
Appellant’s claim.44 The Court of Appeals, while reviewing a ruling for
summary judgment, has de novo jurisdiction and must draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.45
Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate religious
practices of employees except in cases where doing so would cause an undue
hardship to the employer’s business.46 The most common religious practice
requiring accommodation is observance of the Sabbath.47 The United States
Supreme Court ruled previously on this specific issue, finding that a law
giving observers of the Sabbath an absolute right to refuse to work on the
Sabbath is not beyond accommodation.48 While there is no freestanding
“failure to accommodate” action under Title VII, the Supreme Court has ruled
that it is incorporated within an analysis of disparate treatment.49 In order to
bring a claim for disparate treatment, an applicant must show that an employer
failed to hire the applicant – or otherwise took adverse action against the
applicant – because of the applicant’s religion or religious practice.50
Employers are exempt from this standard with a showing that adherence to
one’s religious practice would create an “undue hardship” on the operation of
its business.51 Accommodations that would force an employer to violate a
40. Id. at 804; see generally Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell
Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment
under Title VII, 87 CALIF. L.R. 983 (1999).
41. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04.
42. Id. at 806.
43. Id. at 804 (finding that pretext could merely be a stated reason which thinly
veils the actual, discriminatory reason).
44. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1098.
45. Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 900–01 (8th Cir. 2010).
46. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709–10 (1985); 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
47. Clare Zerangue, Sabbath Observance and the Workplace: Religion Clause
Analysis and Title VII’s Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 46 LO. L. REV. 1265, 1277
(1986).
48. See Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (1985) (holding that although a statute
requiring employers to respect Sabbath observers’ rights of refusal is in violation of
the Establishment Clause it is not beyond accommodation in all cases).
49. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015).
50. Id. at 2032.
51. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002).
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collectively bargained agreement are regularly found to cause undue
hardship.52
The other category, prohibition of retaliatory conduct, creates liability
for employers who take adverse employment actions against employees
engaging in protected opposition to discrimination by an employer.53 An
employee engaging in a protected activity is safe from retaliation under Title
VII.54 The prima facie case of retaliation is (1) that the employee or applicant
engaged in a protected activity, (2) that an adverse employment action
occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and
the adverse action.55 To be considered an adverse employment action,
plaintiffs need only show that “a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse.”56 Courts have consistently shown that
actions such as termination and refusal to hire an applicant meet the standard
of material adversity.57 The causation link is also relaxed, at least in the prima
facie stage, and can be satisfied by showing subsequent adverse action taken
with knowledge of employee’s protected conduct.58
The types of protected activities vary greatly. The classic example of a
protected activity comes from Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale and Retail
Stores, in which an employee engaged in a protest against her employer who
she believed was unlawfully discriminating against black people in its
employment practices.59 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted
in Payne that not all activity was protected, calling specific attention to acts
that are illegal, unreasonably hostile, or that interfere with the performance of
the employee’s job rendering them ineffective for the position.60 Other
examples demonstrate that protected activities include passive participation in
internal investigations for employment discrimination61 and assistance to
another in opposing an activity.62

52. See id. at 391 (holding that an employer was not required to violate an
established seniority system in order to accommodate an employee’s valid request, as
the request posed an undue hardship).
53. Robbins v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 186 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.
1999).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018) (the protected activities specified by statute are:
opposition to practice made unlawful by the Act, making of a charge against an
employer, or testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation or other
proceeding).
55. Ackel v. Nat’l Comm., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003).
56. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
57. See generally § 2000e-3; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
58. Ackel, 339 F.3d at 385–86.
59. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1134 (5th
Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 1142.
61. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271,
277–78 (2009).
62. Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 49 (5th Cir. 2010).
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One key aspect of the retaliation clause of Title VII is that the protected
activity may be done in opposition to an employer’s unlawful practice.63 The
Supreme Court has ruled that, as the statute leaves the term undefined, the
word “oppose” carries its “ordinary meaning.”64 In Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Supreme Court
considered the situation of an employee who was sexually harassed and
ultimately fired, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the harassment.65 In its
holding, the Court found that the employee’s opposition – giving a
disapproving statement of her supervisor’s sexually harassing behavior – was
sufficient opposition.66 In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected an opinion of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that opposition, as
defined by the statute, requires an active form of opposition instigated by the
employee.67 The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning, in part,
because it did not align with the statute’s primary objective of avoiding harm
to employees.68 In addition, the Supreme Court posited that adoption of any
other rule would lead to a fear of retaliation, encouraging individuals to
remain silent instead of voicing their concerns about discrimination.69

B. Similarly Worded Provisions in Context of the American with
Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) contains identical
language to Title VII regarding retaliation for protected activities and
reasonable accommodations.70 Courts commonly rely on Title VII decisions
in interpreting the more recently enacted ADA because of the similarity of
their provisions.71 The Eighth Circuit has relied on this method of
interpretation in the past, particularly with retaliation claims.72 Specifically,
the Eighth Circuit has analyzed similarly worded provisions regarding a
request for accommodation in Heisler v. Metropolitan Council.73 In Heisler,
the plaintiff requested a schedule change to accommodate her depression.74
63. In the alternative, it can also be due to a claimant’s participation in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII, known as the “participation
clause.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018).
64. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276.
65. Id. at 273–74.
66. Id. at 276.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 279 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998)).
69. Id.
70. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2018).
71. Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers,
Unresolved Courts, 63 Mᴏ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 115, 119 (1998).
72. Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 1999).
73. Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2003).
74. Id. at 625.
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Her request was denied because her schedule was an essential function of the
job.75 The Eighth Circuit considered a retaliation claim, and because the
plaintiff specifically claimed she was retaliated against when she requested,
but was refused, accommodation, the Heisler court ruled that the request was
a protected activity.76 This is the background with which the Eighth Circuit
was operating within when considering the instant case, North Memorial.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
This Section considers the specific rationale advanced by the Eighth
Circuit panel in coming to its decision in North Memorial. It begins by
providing an in-depth analysis of the rule articulated by the majority and the
majority’s reasoning for the rule. This Section concludes by discussing the
detracting points raised by the dissent.

A. Majority Opinion
The Eighth Circuit decided that statutorily authorized requests for
accommodation under Title VII were not also considered statutorily protected
opposition activities under the same Title VII.77 The Eighth Circuit panel
began its analysis by discussing the basis on which a person can assert a need
for a reasonable accommodation under Title VII.78 The panel noted that a
person’s religion is entitled to protection from discriminatory employment
practices under Title VII.79 In particular, the panel stated that an employer
cannot refuse to hire any individual because of such individual’s “religious
observance and practice.”80 The court reasoned from this that it was “clear
that [Appellant] . . . was entitled to reasonable accommodation of her religious
practice as a Seventh Day Adventist.”81
The panel then moved on to the unlawful-opposition portion of Title VII,
codified in § 2000e-3(a).82 Referring to Supreme Court precedent set in
Crawford, the panel noted that a communication to an employer that the
employer has engaged in some form of employment discrimination “virtually
always” constitutes opposition.83 The panel squarely focused on the “obvious
question,” that is, what was the form of employment discrimination Appellant
opposed?84 The EEOC asserted that Appellant was opposing a conflict of
75. Id.
76. Id. at 632.
77. See N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102.
78. Id. at 1100–01.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1101.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty, 555.
U.S. 271, 276 (2009)).
84. Id. at 1102.
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religious rights and employment requirements.85 Specifically, the EEOC
argued that Appellant’s situation was similar to Ollis v. HearthStone Homes,
Inc.,86 where an employee was fired due to a refusal to participate in an
activity that conflicted with his religious beliefs.87 The court differentiated
North Memorial from Ollis on two separate grounds: (1) the court required a
showing that religious belief conflicts with an employment requirement; and
(2) Appellant did not complain that she was refused an accommodation but
rather was attempting to make an accommodation.88 The panel agreed directly
with the reasoning of the district court, finding that “merely requesting a
religious accommodation is not the same as opposing the allegedly unlawful
denial of a religious accommodation.”89
The panel also considered the EEOC’s argument that, instead of using
the plain meaning of the word “oppose,” the court should consider the
definition applied in related ADA cases using identical language – Kirkeberg
v. Canadian Pacific Railway and Heisler v. Metro. Council.90 In this sense,
the court considered the factual bases of Kirkeberg as well as Heisler and
imported their reasoning to the religious discrimination context.91 The court
reasoned that the cases were not illustrative because the facts were too
different.92 In those cases, the employers’ denial of an existing qualifying
condition – disability under the ADA – coupled with a termination or refusal
to hire due to the request was at issue.93 The court determined that a factual
distinction existed between the Kirkeberg and Heisler cases and Appellant’s
case since Appellant was refused accommodation due to undue hardship, not
a lack of qualification under the statute.94 On this basis, the court found that
a request for accommodation in related ADA cases was protected, yet a
request for accommodation in a Title VII case was not protected.95 Therefore,
the panel ruled, there was no protected activity at issue in Appellant’s case
that North Memorial unlawfully retaliated against.96
The panel determined that as Title VII did not define the word “oppose,”
it must apply the plain meaning of the word in its analysis.97 In the panel’s
view, Appellant’s initial request for accommodation did not implicitly

85. Id.
86. 495 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007).
87. Id. at 574.
88. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102.
89. Id. (quoting N. Mem’l Health Care, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 867).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1102–03.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Kirkeberg v. Can. Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2010);
Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003)).
94. Id. at 1103.
95. Id. at 1102–03.
96. Id. at 1103.
97. Id. at 1102.
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constitute an opposition to North Memorial’s decision not to hire.98 As such,
Appellant’s request for accommodation was not a protected, oppositional
activity under Title VII.99
The majority last considered the argument that North Memorial’s
rescinding of Appellant’s offer was an adverse employment action.100
Proclaiming the argument as “sophistry,” the majority reasoned that because
some evidence showed Appellant was unwilling to perform the job’s essential
functions, summary judgment against her was still proper.101

B. The Dissent
Judge L. Steven Grasz dissented, citing related Supreme Court
precedent, the Eighth Circuit’s own precedent, as well as persuasive authority
from other federal circuits.102 The dissent agreed with the majority that the
primary issue was whether requesting a religious accommodation constituted
a “protected activity” that could be understood as opposition against an
unlawful employment practice.103
However, the dissent argued it was improper for the majority to apply
the plain and ordinary definition of the word “oppose,” as the Supreme Court
has adopted an “expansive view of the opposition clause, such that an
individual does not need to directly or overtly communicate opposition to an
unlawful employment practice.”104
The dissent also asserted the
commonsense argument that “the request itself conveys opposition to the
employer’s failure to accommodate the applicant’s . . . religion.”105 In a
footnote, the dissent noted that only a “good faith, objectively reasonable
belief” was needed for a request to be valid, and that, for the purposes of
summary judgment, Appellant was opposed to the denial of what she believed
was an accommodation to which she was entitled.106
Further, the dissent explained that the prevailing theory in other circuits
dealing with similar issues is to harmonize interpretations of nearly identical
ADA statutes by reading them the same way.107 It explained that the principle
of in pari materia108 demanded identical interpretation of identical statutory

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1103.
101. Id. at 1103–04.
102. Id. at 1104 (Grasz, J. dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271).
105. Id. at 1105.
106. Id. at 1098 n.4 (quoting Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc. 641 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir.
2011)).
107. Id. at 1105.
108. In English: “in a like manner.” THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/in+pari+materia [perma.cc/Y3TQ-ZF46].
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language “unless context dictates otherwise.”109 The dissent also cited past
Eighth Circuit precedent that stated “retaliation claims under the ADA are
analyzed identically to those brought under Title VII.”110 The dissent
concluded that the other two elements of a retaliation claim were adequately
met for purposes of summary judgment and argued that policy concerns about
potentially meritless claims arising were unnecessary worries, as the causation
element of retaliation claims would properly protect employers.111
Specifically, the dissent found that an employer could show the legitimacy of
the action by presenting evidence of an employee’s “inability to perform the
job,” which would insulate the employer from liability.112 The dissent
differentiated Appellant’s case from that rationale on the basis that Appellant
showed she could perform the task.113
The EEOC petitioned the court for rehearing en banc, based on perceived
conflicts with Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent.114 However, the
petition for rehearing en banc was denied on February 11, 2019.115

V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit has taken an uncertain, unclear step against the
current of precedent surrounding requests for religious accommodations
under Title VII with its ruling in North Memorial. There are significant
concerns about the grounding of the panel’s decision when compared to
precedent of the Eighth Circuit itself, general directives of the Supreme Court,
and interpretation of identical language by other federal circuits. The Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning could have a significant impact on the viability of future
retaliation claims, which are the most frequently alleged basis for suit under
Title VII in the federal courts system.116

109. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1105 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).
110. Id. (quoting Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir.
1999)).
111. Id. at 1106–07.
112. Id.
113. Id. (noting that Appellant stated she would be able to cover her shifts when
necessary).
114. Brief of North Memorial Health Care in Opposition to the EEOC’s Petition
for Rehearing En Banc, at 1, EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir.
2018) (No. 17-2926), 2019 WL 328056.
115. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098.
116. Facts About Retaliation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm
[perma.cc/JL2J-KNJR]
(“Retaliation is the most frequently alleged basis of discrimination in the federal
sector.”).
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A. The Panel’s Strict Reading of Title VII is at Odds with Related
Authority
1. The Eight Circuit’s Own Precedent
The panel considered a prior case involving a retaliation claim based on
an employee’s request for a religious accommodation.117 In Ollis, the
defendant company, HearthStone Homes, implicitly required employees to
attend “Mind Body Energy” sessions, which made use of Buddhist and Hindu
teachings.118 The plaintiff was uncomfortable with this because he perceived
the sessions as a conflict with his religion, told a supervisor about this conflict,
and requested permission to not participate.119 The court determined that to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must first show that “he
engaged in statutorily protected activity.”120 The evidence relevant to this
point was (1) that the sessions actually conflicted with the plaintiff’s beliefs
and (2) that he expressed this disagreement to his employer.121 The court
determined that the evidence, considered under summary judgment, showed
a conflict.122 It did not go into further detail about this conflict, however. In
particular, the court did not explain whether the “expressed disagreement”
arose from his actual explanation that the sessions conflicted with his beliefs
or his request to be excused from the sessions because they conflicted with his
beliefs.123 Apparently, from a comparison of North Memorial and Ollis, it
was the former – his explanation of a conflict between the sessions and his
religion – that protected him, not the request.
The panel in North Memorial considered this context but differentiated,
noting it was a “false equation” to say Appellant, by requesting an
accommodation, was necessarily complaining that requiring her to work
Friday shifts conflicted with her beliefs the same way the plaintiff in Ollis
did.124 The panel stated that Appellant did not complain that North Memorial
refused to accommodate but was merely requesting accommodation
instead.125 However, when viewing the facts in Ollis, the plaintiff there was
not complaining of a refusal to accommodate either.126 Instead, the plaintiff
stated a conflict between his religion and the employment practice and then
requested to be excused from the practice.127 In essence, the only possible
117. Ollis v. HearthStone Homes, Inc., 495 F.3d 570, 574–75 (8th Cir. 2007).
118. Id. at 573.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 576.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102.
125. Id.
126. Ollis, 495 F.3d at 576 (finding a prima facie case for retaliation based upon
an interaction where employee complained and requested accommodation).
127. Id. at 573.
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distinction between these two cases is that requesting an accommodation and
then stating the reason for the accommodation is not protected, but if you
reverse the process by stating a reason why you need an accommodation and
then request the accommodation, you are protected. This arbitrary distinction
directly conflicts with the well-established rule followed by other courts that
the language of Title VII should be interpreted broadly to help maintain
employees’ “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”128
The Eighth Circuit declared in 1999 that retaliation claims under the
ADA were analyzed identically to retaliation claims under Title VII.129 This
is a reasonable proclamation, as it follows the familiar concept of statutory
interpretation described by the Supreme Court, pari passu, where two
different statutes with similar language are interpreted in the same way, as if
they were “side by side.”130 There is a need to interpret statutes in this way to
ensure “Congress [is] able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”131
This gives a “strong indication”132 that the opposition clauses of the ADA and
Title VII should be read in harmony with one another, as their language is
nearly identical133 and both have the goal of preventing persons from being
interfered with when exercising their rights.134
Eighth Circuit precedent demonstrates how similar ADA retaliation
claims have been read, particularly in the noted case Heisler v. Metropolitan
Council.135 Recall that Heisler involved a plaintiff who requested an
accommodation for her depression – a change in scheduled working hours like
the Appellant in North Memorial – was denied the request as it was an
essential job function, and subsequently succeeded on a retaliation claim.136
The panel in North Memorial, when distinguishing Heisler, stated that “if the
128. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
129. Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 1999).
130. Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)
(finding two acts with similar language with the same goal to be a strong indication
that the acts should read side by side). This is similar to the reasoning used by Judge
Grasz in the dissent. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1105 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012))
(finding the principal of in pari materia required the court to interpret identical
statutory language consistently with one another).
131. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
132. Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428.
133. The only substantive differences between the two provisions are due to the
extra language added by Title VII which specifies what parties are not allowed to
discriminate. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018) with 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)
(2018).
134. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (finding a primary
purpose of antiretaliation provisions to be to maintain unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms).
135. Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 2003).
136. Id. at 625.
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employer denied the accommodation on the ground that it was not in fact
based on a religious practice and . . . refused to hire the . . . applicant because
she made the request, the reasoning [of Heisler] would support an oppositionclause retaliation claim.”137 But because the plaintiff in Heisler specifically
claimed she was retaliated against when she requested, but was refused,
accommodation the Heisler court ruled that the request was a protected
activity without any mention of the employer’s reason for denying the
accommodation.138 Yet, in North Memorial, the panel held that a request does
require the reasoning of the employer to be based on a disbelief of the presence
of a religious practice instead of on the basis of the accommodation being an
undue burden.139 In Heisler, a retaliation claim existed, but in North
Memorial, it did not. The only distinction between these two situations was
the justification that the employer gave as to why the employer denied the
accommodation. But such a justification must withstand Appellant’s attempts
to show the justification was a mere pretext for discrimination, which did not
occur in North Memorial. It was most simply put in the dissent: “If the request
is opposition in the one context, it cannot transform into something other than
opposition simply because the legal justification for denying the request
changes.”140

2. The Supreme Court’s and Other Federal Appellate Courts’
Analyses
The Supreme Court has adopted an expansive view in interpreting the
opposition-retaliation clause of Title VII.141 In Crawford, the Supreme Court
considered reports of inappropriate behavior in an internal investigation to be
a protected activity.142 This was significantly different from the prior Sixth
Circuit opinion, which held only that an “active and consistent” opposition
was protected against retaliation.143 The Sixth Circuit’s definition of
protected opposition seems to stem from the classic form of opposition in
Payne, where an employee protested outside the doors of his employer’s
business due to its unlawful behavior.144
The panel decision in North Memorial proposed that the word “oppose”
did not incorporate an official, statutorily authorized act of requesting an
accommodation.145 In light of Crawford, the panel explicitly referenced that
137. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018).
138. Heisler, 339 F.3d at 632.
139. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103.
140. Id. at 1098, n.7.
141. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U.S.
271 (2009).
142. Id. at 275.
143. Id.
144. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1134 (5th
Cir. 1981).
145. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102.
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this would “stretch[] the word ‘oppose’ well beyond its plain or ordinary
meaning.”146 But the Supreme Court in Crawford referenced possible
scenarios where opposition would be sufficient, stating that the biggest hurdle
is not whether the action was an opposition but whether the employer had
knowledge of the opposition.147 The Supreme Court gave the following
examples of instances where opposition was sufficient: expressing opposition
while (1) informally chatting with a coworker at a water cooler; or (2) in a
conversation after work in a restaurant.148 Both of these scenarios were
presumed by the Supreme Court to be opposition, yet the panel in North
Memorial found a request for accommodation – which is explicitly provided
for in Title VII149 – to be an insufficient form of opposition not because of its
broader character and meaning but because of its lack of an explicit
“complaint.”150
In addition to the Supreme Court’s directive on retaliation, there are
additional persuasive factors that the Eighth Circuit panel ignored. Most
prominent among them was a denial of the EEOC’s own interpretation of the
statute its enforces.151 It is well-established that an agency’s interpretation of
the statutory scheme the agency is entrusted to enforce should be given
considerable weight by the courts.152 Particularly, the interpretation is not to
be disturbed so long as it is reasonable in light of the statute.153 The EEOC
Compliance Manual states the agency’s interpretation of the retaliation
provision as applied to requests for religious accommodation: “persons
requesting religious accommodation under Title VII are protected against
retaliation for making such requests.”154 A manual like this is one that the
Supreme Court has, at the very least, determined reflects a body of experience
and informed judgments that courts should consider with a “measure of
respect.”155 In North Memorial, the panel seemed to justify its decision to
circumvent the EEOC’s position by explaining that in prior decisions,
specifically EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, the Supreme Court, too, has
circumvented the agency’s positions.156

146. Id. at 1098, n.2.
147. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 282 (Alito, J. concurring).
148. Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2018).
150. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103.
151. Id. at 1102.
152. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
153. Id. (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
154. PATRICIA A WISE, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING WORKPLACE
RETALIATION APPENDIX B: EEOC GUIDANCE (2004), 2004 WL 5046196.
155. Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (quoting Alaska
Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 488 (2004)) (noting that agencies
may not be entitled to full Chevron deference where the position of the agency is not
consistent, but still at the very least deserve some measure of deference).
156. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1102.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 9

244

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

When interpreting similar statutes in the ADA context, other federal
circuits have applied similar rationales and reached similar holdings as those
proposed by the dissent.157 Federal circuits, in interpreting this specific issue,
have looked to the statutory intent of Congress in passing Title VII.158 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the right to request an
accommodation was a statutory guarantee, regardless of whether the
individual meets the qualifications necessary for a typical discrimination
claim.159 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that “it would
seem anomalous . . . to think Congress intended no retaliation protection for
employees who request a reasonable accommodation unless they also file a
formal charge.”160 The panel, in addressing this issue, claimed that “the fact
that such a request is a ‘protected activity’ does not mean it is always
‘oppositional’ activity.”161 This is either incorrect or an accidental divergence
in terminology, as it is well settled that a “protected activity” is only
considered so because it is protected by the retaliation clause.162 Even if not,
the panel still acknowledged congressional intent to protect religious
accommodations yet denied retaliation protection of that same right.163
Although these decisions are merely persuasive authority, they are indicative
of the Eighth Circuit’s anomalous interpretation of “oppose” under Title VII;
indeed, it cited no other circuit in reaching its decision.

B. The Panel’s Decision is Unclear and Potentially Far-Reaching
In North Memorial, the panel raised several concerns regarding
Appellant’s claim, such as a fear that allowing such a cause of action would
result in a “re-packaging” of rejected discrimination claims.164 The panel
based its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s rejection of a free-standing
religious accommodation claim that the EEOC supported, and thus rejected
this retaliation claim as a “re-packaging” of the prior claim.165 As such, the
panel determined that the action of Appellant was proper under a disparate
impact or treatment theory, rather than a retaliation theory.166 This reasoning
reveals two critical errors, however. First, it misunderstands the nature of an
employment discrimination claim – which requires a showing that religion
157. Id. at 1098, n.5 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing references to opinions in the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits).
158. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2003).
159. Id.
160. Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997).
161. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103.
162. Grimes v. Tx. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137,
140 (5th Cir. 1996).
163. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1103.
164. Id. at 1102.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1103.
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was a motivating factor – and retaliation – which requires causation between
the adverse employment action and the protected activity.167 As there was no
evidence on the record that reasonably supported a disparate treatment theory,
this Section will only consider the disparate impact theory.168 A claim for
discrimination under a disparate impact theory turns to the widespread impact
that a facially neutral policy would have on a group of people, whereas the
retaliation claim would turn on whether the adverse action taken against
Appellant was due to her own protected activity.169 This gets at the heart of
the panel’s fundamental error: Appellant was not suing because a facially
neutral policy adversely affected her. Appellant was suing because she, for
all intents and purposes, received a job offer, requested accommodation, and
was punished for that request by a rescission of the job offer.170
The error here was that the panel took North Memorial’s stated reason
for rejecting Appellant’s request at face value, despite the need to view the
facts in a light most favorable to Appellant. The panel stated it was
“sophistry” to consider that retaliation occurred when North Memorial
rescinded its job offer.171 The panel said so because Appellant’s “right to
religious accommodation” was the “same,” what mattered was that she was
an unable or unwilling employee and therefore it was not feasible to hire
her.172 But as the non-moving party, Appellant was entitled to a viewing of
that fact in a light most favorable to her, meaning the evidence on the record
that she would “make it work” should preclude the notion that there was no
feasibility in hiring her.173 Regardless, once the prima facie case was made,
and a defense was produced, it should have been Appellant’s burden to prove
the defense was pretextual under the McDonnell Douglas Framework – a
chance she did not receive.174

VI. CONCLUSION
Despite a plethora of persuasive precedent, expansive interpretations
from the Supreme Court, and precedent from the Eighth Circuit itself, the
panel in North Memorial found Appellant’s claim to be lacking an adequate

167. Compare EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2028, 2034
(2015) with Sieden v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 846 F.3d 1013, 1016–17 (8th Cir.
2017).
168. This is because disparate treatment evidence requires, at least in part, intent
to discriminate in addition to statistical data, making it far different from the instant
case. See Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). Since
a disparate treatment theory is so dissimilar, it is not analyzed here.
169. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988).
170. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d at 1099.
171. Id. at 1103.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1100, 1103.
174. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th
Cir. 1981).
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opposition-retaliation claim. The effects of the ruling, in isolation, are not
particularly devastating given the strong, conflicting precedent in this area,
although there is evidence that some attorneys representing employers are
taking this decision as a signal to relax their standards within the
jurisdiction.175 However, with retaliation claims currently making up nearly
half of all employment discrimination claims176 and continuing to increase177
clarification is necessary since, on its face, the decision in North Memorial
does not find an action sanctioned by Title VII to also be a protected activity
under Title VII.

175. Dawn Reddy Solowey, Court Rules Request for Religious Accommodation Is
Not “Protected Activity” for Title VII Retaliation, SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP (July 20,
2017)
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/07/court-rulesrequest-for-religious-accommodation-is-not-protected-activity-for-title-viiretaliation/ [perma.cc/LR6T-M29K]; Appeals Court Rejects Retaliation Claim Based
On Religious Accommodation Request, FISHER PHILLIPS (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-appeals-court-rejects-retaliationclaim-based-on [perma.cc/UE84-2HVX].
176. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases
Fiscal Year 2017 Enforcement and Litigation Data (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-25-18.cfm
[perma.cc/9MSJAXNV].
177. The State Of Play For Retaliation Claims, FISHER PHILLIPS (Aug. 31, 2018)
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-the-state-of-play-forretaliation-claims [perma.cc./FHD3-SWHB].
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